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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jorge A. Mora Elizondo entered an Alford1 plea to felony injury to a child, and the
State agreed to recommend local jail time and probation. But, at sentencing, the
prosecutor impliedly disavowed the State’s promised sentence and breached the plea
agreement. The district court sentenced Mr. Elizondo to five years, with two years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction. Mr. Elizondo appeals from the district court’s judgment of
conviction, contending State violated his due process rights by breaching the plea
agreement. He also contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in
Mr. Elizondo’s Appellant’s Brief. They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

ISSUES
1.

Did the State deprive Mr. Elizondo of his right to due process when the State
breached the plea agreement by impliedly disavowing its promised sentencing
recommendation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
five years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Elizondo, following his Alford plea to
felony injury to a child?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Deprived Mr. Elizondo Of His Right To Due Process When The State
Breached The Plea Agreement By Impliedly Disavowing Its Promised Sentencing
Recommendation
The State argues the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement with her
argument at sentencing. (Respt. Br., pp.4–10.) Mr. Elizondo respectfully disagrees. The
prosecutor’s argument in this case was akin to the arguments rebuked by the Court of
Appeals in Jones, Daubs, and Wills. In none of these cases did the prosecutor explicitly
recommend a harsher penalty than the State’s promised sentence. State v. Jones, 139
Idaho 299, 300–01 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 300, 301 (Ct. App.
2004); State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 774 (Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the prosecutor
implicitly recommended a harsher penalty through argument that conveyed a
reservation about or lack of support for the State’s recommendation. Jones, 139 Idaho
at 300–01, 303; Daubs, 140 Idaho at 300, 301; Wills, 140 Idaho at 774, 775–76. Thus,
the prosecutor does not have to completely undermine the recommendation to
constitute a breach. A “disregard of a plea agreement can be made manifest in more
than one way.” Daubs, 140 Idaho at 301. If the prosecutor’s overall conduct is
inconsistent with the recommendation, a breach has occurred. See Jones, 139 Idaho at
302. That level of inconsistency or disregard occurred here. The prosecutor focused on
the PSI recommendation, the “very serious allegations, a very disturbing set of facts,”
and the harm to the victim. (Tr. Vol. II,2 p.12, L.17–p.14, L.4.) The prosecutor made an

There are three transcripts on appeal. The transcript of the entry of plea hearing will
be cited at Volume I, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing will be cited at Volume
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argument “fundamentally at odds” with the State’s promised sentence for leniency. See
Jones, 139 Idaho at 303.
The State also argues that the prosecutor simply talked about the facts of the
case and logical inferences. (Resp. Br., pp.7–8.) And the State discounts Mr. Elizondo’s
analysis of specific statements made by the prosecutor throughout her argument.
(Resp. Br., pp.8–10.) These specific statements, however, make it eminently clear that
this is not an argument advocating for an individual to be placed on probation. The
prosecutor emphasized punishment, retribution, protection of society, and deterrence.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.17–p.14, L.4.) The prosecutor said nothing in support of
rehabilitation. In fact, the prosecutor advocated for “significant jail time imposed without
the potential for work release or even treatment release, if that was appropriate.”
(Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.5–10 (emphasis added).) This argument is incompatible with a
recommendation for probation—the primary goal being rehabilitation. State v. Mummert,
98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977); State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). Here,
the prosecutor acknowledged the “bound” recommendation, but then disavowed any
basis for probation and implicitly recommended a harsher penalty.
Additionally, the State has failed to meet its burden to prove harmlessness due to
its waiver of the issue. Mr. Elizondo objected to the prosecutor’s argument at
sentencing, thus preserving the issue for appeal. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.7–10.) If a
constitutional violation occurs and is followed by an objection, the harmless error
standard applies. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Under this standard,

II. The third transcript of the preliminary hearing is not relevant to this appeal and will
not be cited herein.
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Mr. Elizondo has the burden to establish the error, but the State has the burden to prove
the error was harmless. Id. at 221, 227. The State must prove “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the [sentence imposed].” Perry,
150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Here, the
State made no argument in its brief that the constitutional violation was harmless. (See
Resp. Br., pp.4–10.) By failing to argue the issue, the State has waived it and cannot
meet its burden to prove harmlessness. See State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598–99,
600–01 (2013) (conviction vacated because the State failed to argue alleged errors
were harmless); State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010) (“The State has not argued
that the error was harmless. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of conviction.”); State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (a party waives an issue by failing to present
argument or authority). Therefore, if this Court concludes Mr. Elizondo established a
due process violation for the State’s breach of the plea agreement, Mr. Elizondo’s
judgment of conviction must be vacated for a new sentencing hearing. See Almaraz,
154 Idaho at 598–99, 600–01; Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Elizondo, Following His Alford Plea To Felony
Injury To A Child
The State agrees with Mr. Elizondo’s contention that the district court erred by
misidentifying the conduct to which Mr. Elizondo entered an Alford plea. (Resp.
Br., pp.14–15.) The error occurred when the district court stated Mr. Elizondo committed
felony injury to a child by “choking her by placing his hands around her neck while he
was on top of her.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.5–11.) This is contrary to the Amended
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Information, which provided that Mr. Elizondo committed the offense by “having sexual
contact.” (R., pp.42–43.)
Despite the error, the State argues it was harmless because the district court
may consider uncharged conduct or dismissed charges at sentencing. (Resp. Br., p.15.)
The district court has discretion to consider a wide range of relevant information at
sentencing, but an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court misunderstands
the nature of the offense.
A sentencing judge may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited, either as to kind of information considered or the source
from which it may come. . . . Consideration of a defendant’s past criminal
history is appropriate when fashioning a sentence. A sentencing court
may, with due caution, consider the existence of defendant’s alleged
criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or where charges
have been dismissed.
State v. Wickel, 126 Idaho 578, 580–81 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). “Due
caution” is not exercised when the district court believes the dismissed charge or
uncharged conduct is the charged conduct. Dismissed charges or uncharged conduct
must be considered and weighed with caution in comparison to the actual conduct for
which the defendant pled guilty. Otherwise, the district court has the power to sentence
the defendant not for the offense, but for whatever conduct it deems fit. This is the very
definition of an abuse of discretion.
In this case, the district court considered uncharged conduct to be the charged
conduct. It did not exercise “due caution” in considering this conduct. The district court
believed Mr. Elizondo caused injury to a child “choking her” and sentenced him
accordingly. (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.5–11.) Moreover, the district court did not even discuss
the dismissed charges or uncharged conduct at sentencing—likely because the facts of
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this case were highly disputed. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.12–21, p.15, Ls.13–16.)
Mr. Elizondo was sentenced for the wrong conduct, and the State has failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt this error did not contribute to the sentence imposed. Perry,
150 Idaho at 221.
Finally, Mr. Elizondo respectfully refers the Court to his arguments in his
Appellant’s Brief on the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating circumstances. He maintains
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give adequate weight to the
mitigating factors in his case.3

In a footnote, the State calls into question Mr. Elizondo’s acceptance of responsibility.
The State notes that the presentence investigator did not believe Mr. Elizondo accepted
responsibility for the crime. (Resp. Br., p.17 n.4 (citing PSI, p.13).)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Elizondo contested these unsupported opinions by
the presentence investigator. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.5–p.8, L.3.) In response, the State
provided, “I just leave that to the Court’s discretion. I think counsel’s objection is
appropriate on his end, but I don’t know that it should be completely removed.” (Tr. Vol.
II, p.8, Ls.6–9.) The district court then ruled, “I am not going to consider these
statements.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.10–11; see also Tr. Vol. II, p.19, Ls.11–17.) Therefore,
the State cannot rely on the presentence investigator’s opinions about Mr. Elizondo’s
acceptance of responsibility. Those opinions were rejected by the district court.
3
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Elizondo respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing before a different district judge, with
instructions that the State recommend a sentence that strictly adheres to the plea
agreement. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as
it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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